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Abstract 
Standard-setting coalitions are increasingly composed of rival firms from different sectors and 
are characterized by simultaneous and/or sequential cooperation and competition among their 
members. This paper examines why firms choose to belong to two standard-setting coalitions 
instead of one and what determines the success of a standard coalition. We test empirically for 
network effect, experience effect, and coopetitive effect in the Blu-ray vs. HD-DVD standard 
war. We find that the higher the similarity of the members in the coalition, the greater the 
probability of standard coalition success. Furthermore, relatedness leads to a greater 
probability of joining both competing coalitions, but at a given degree of knowledge 
difference, an opposite effect exists. 
 
Keywords: Blu-ray, HD-DVD, coalition, coopetition, standard war 
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1. Introduction 
 
The last two decades have seen a marked increase in standardization (Arthur, 1998; Warner, 
2003), especially with the convergence of the various technologies and demand from 
information technology, media and telecommunications and the resulting broader portfolio of 
competencies. This has led to an increased need for standards for the rapidly growing 
industries involved in the delivery both of data and content and of digitalization (Shapiro, 
2001a). 
 
In this respect, both competitors and complementary component providers have incentives to 
work together to develop, establish, endorse and promote common standards. This should 
provide many opportunities for cooperation aimed at offering adequate support to ensure the 
success of new technologies and standards. 
 
Several examples show the need for cooperation to successfully establish new standards: in 
the consumer electronics sector (Gandal et al., 2000; the Sony/Philips standards for CD 
players and disks, Cusumano et al., 1992; Ohashi, 2003; the VHS standard for video cassette 
players; Dranove and Gandal, 2003; digital versatile disks; Egyedi & Koppenhol, 2009;  
document formats ODF and OOXML), in the computer hardware sector (Koski, 1999; 
personal computers), in the computer software sector (Brynjolfsson and Kemerer, 1996), in 
the financial sector (Miller and Rao, 1994; Shapiro and Varian, 1999 for ATM) in the 
communications sectors (Augereau and Greenstein, 2001; 56K modems; Korzeniowski, 1999; 
FDDI) and in wireless telecommunications (Leiponen, 2008; UMTS). 
 
Thus, it is not unusual to find companies like Sony, JVC, Hitachi, Matsushita (Panasonic) and 
Toshiba, or Sun Microsystems and Microsoft closely linked through a series of relationships 
that are both cooperative and competitive, known as "coopetition" (Nalebuff and 
Brandenburger, 1996; Bengtsson and Kock, 2000). For example, from 2001 to 2005, IBM, 
Sony and Toshiba teamed up to develop high-performance microprocessor (called Cell). In 
2004, Hitachi, Toshiba and Matsushita agreed to jointly establish a company to manufacture 
liquid crystal display (LCD) panels for flat-panel TVs. Meanwhile, Sony and Toshiba were 
fighting in the Blu-ray versus HD-DVD standards war and Sun Microsystems and Microsoft 
in the document format standard war.2  
 
In fact, cooperative agreements among competitors have proliferated in recent years (Padula 
and Dagnino, 2007; Ghosh and Morita, 2007) and about 50 percent of new alliances are 
among competitors, according to Harbison and Pekar (1998) or Gnyawali and Madhavan 
(2001). Although standardization may lead to voluntary cooperation among players concerned 
with obtaining a standard that will meet consumer interests, ensuring the competitiveness of 
the firms or interoperability, standardization processes are also the result of standard wars 
(Shapiro and Varian, 1999). It is thus not unusual to find apparently contradictory interests 
driving the standardization processes. Standardization is therefore the result both of voluntary 
cooperation among some of the parties and of intense competition among them. 
 
Coalitions formed in support of a particular standard increasingly rely on heterogeneous 
actors from different sectors forming a community based on strategic interest or value 
networked around a founder-leader capable of imposing or communicating its marketing 
                                                            
2 ODF supported by Sun Microsystems and OOXML supported by Microsoft. 
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approach or technological standard. These coalitions involve rivals firms ranging from 
manufacturers, innovation specialists, integrated firms to distributors and commercial 
companies. Mixed coalitions of rival firms from different business sectors constitute business 
ecosystems (Moore, 1996; Iansiti and Levien, 2004). These business ecosystems are 
characterized by simultaneous and/or sequential cooperation and competition among their 
members. The underlying objective of these alliances of competitors (alliances which form 
specific coalitions) is to avoid a greater threat - that other business ecosystems might emerge - 
and to obtain a cost advantage through economies of scale (Barney, 2002). 
 
However, even when a coalition’s standard succeeds without major obstacles (Schmalensee, 
2009), we do not yet fully understand the factor determining either a coalition’s success or the 
choice of a coalition by its members. The literature on standardization generally takes two 
directions: one focusing on the economic basis of the standards (Arthur, 1994; Shapiro and 
Varian, 1999; Suarez, 2004) and the other on the process of standard setting (Greenstein, 
1992; Weiss, 1993; Lyytinen and King, 2006). Few papers have examined the role of 
coalitions in the success of standards and why some coalitions are more successful than others 
in standard setting, either theoretically (Axelrod et al., 1995; Foray, 1995; Lukach et al., 
2007) or empirically (for example Chiesa et al., 2002 for the multimedia sector; Funk, 2009 
for the mobile phone industry; Leiponen, 2008 for wireless telecommunications; Cortese et 
al., 2009 for the IFRS standard in mining industries). 
  
The Blu-ray vs. HD-DVD standard war started in 2004. Unlike the VHS/Betamax war, Sony 
and Toshiba’s strategies were almost identical. Both firms tried to attract various types of 
partners to their own solution in order to create business ecosystems with the common interest 
of respectively imposing Blu-ray or HD-DVD as the market standard. The Blu Ray Disc 
Association aimed to promote Blu-ray whereas the HD-DVD Promotional Group (Japan), the 
European HD-DVD Promotional Group and the North American HD-DVD Promotional 
Group were formed to promote this standard in the relevant countries. Various industrial firms 
promoted the two formats by joining one or even both coalitions. Stakeholders and 
distribution networks chose to favor one particular coalition: for example, Wal Mart and Best 
Buy distribution channels chose to withdraw films on HD-DVD and sell only Blu-ray films. 
The standard war ended in February 2008 with the victory of the Blu-ray coalition. 
 
Against this background, we focus here on factors that influence standard-setting coalition 
success and the decision to join one or both coalitions. We test empirically for network effect, 
experience effect and coopetitive effect in the Blu-ray vs. HD-DVD standards war by 
considering how (1) the size of participants (2) prior alliances and (3) the number of direct 
competitors involved within the standard-setting coalition affect the success of the standard. 
 
Our data cover 261 companies with 125 supporting the Blu-ray Disc coalition only, 70 
companies supporting the HD-DVD coalition only and the remaining 66 companies 
supporting both standards. Five groups of firms supporting each coalition were distinguished: 
format founders & competitors,3 movie studio supports, major movie rental outlets, 
nationwide retail & major online supports, and miscellaneous companies (companies listed as 
Members, Associate Members, or Contributors). 
 
The aim of this study is to contribute to the understanding of the processes and effects of 
coopetitive standard setting. Although the presence and magnitude of network effects have 
                                                            
3  Including companies listed as Members of the Board or Managing Members and notably grouping two 
categories of players: electronic goods manufacturers and ITC firms. 
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been empirically demonstrated in the literature (Park, 2004), to the best of our knowledge 
there has been no empirical work on the Blu-ray versus HD-DVD standard-setting coalitions 
nor on the associated interaction between network effects, coopetitive effect and social 
network effect.Our results add to the literature both on technology strategy and on policy. 
Management implications suggest that a broad coopetitive standardization approach is more 
beneficial than focusing on a few cooperative arrangements.  
 
This paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the empirical context and reviews the 
existing literature to derive empirical hypotheses. Section 3 presents the methodology and 
data. Section 4 details the results and Section 5 discusses and concludes.  
 
2. Theory and hypotheses 
 
The video storage format industry provides promising material on standards in the consumer 
electronics markets. While the VHS vs. Betamax standards war for video cassette players has 
been the focus of much attention (Cusumano et al., 1992; Ohashi, 2003), this paper focuses on 
the recent standard war between Blu-ray and HD-DVD, respectively originated by Sony and 
Toshiba. The two companies were involved in mixed games of cooperation and competition 
throughout the two standards wars. For instance, in the VHS/Betamax war they were allies 
against the JVC - Matsushita (Panasonic) coalition and were the losers; however in the most 
recent war they were direct competitors.  
 
The advantages of standardization are well known: low integration costs, easy market entry, 
faster product innovation and availability and greater return on investment (see for example 
Suarez, 2004). Numerous attempts have been made to identify the determinants of standard-
setting success. The most often mentioned determinants are size (Weiss and Sirbu, 1990; 
Axelrod et al., 1995) and network effect (Katz and Shapiro 1986; Farrell and Saloner, 1985). 
However, network construction (Gulati, 1995; 1998) and coopetitive effect (Bengtsson et al., 
2010) have seldom been researched.  
 
2.1 Network construction 
 
Prior ties between partner firms (experience) 
 
Strategic alliances represent appropriate means for building and locking-in a market, which 
evolve into alliance blocks or alliance constellations (Gomes-Casseres, 1996; 2003). Alliance 
block membership as an alliance network significantly influences performance (Duysters  and 
Lemmens, 2008) and can be an efficient way of determining the emergence of new standards, 
new concepts and new operating modes in industries (Cowan and Jonard, 2009). 
As a result, standard wars regularly turn into wars between coalitions (Vanhaverbeke and 
Noorderhaven, 2001). These coalitions unite various companies that all have a common 
interest in the standard’s victory: companies developing the standard, firms developing 
complementary goods or services, or belonging to a distributor network. Coalitions or alliance 
blocks are, then, heterogeneous: they come from different sectors supporting horizontal, 
vertical and transverse relationships in a dynamic perspective (Hearn and Peace, 2006). 
Although several studies have examined the effects of relational and structural embeddedness 
on company and alliance performance (see e.g., Gulati and Gargiulo, 1999; Rowley et al. 
2000; Gnyawali and Madhavan, 2001), this study focuses on external networks of cooperation 
(Leiponen, 2008). Prior alliances or experience offer partners the opportunity to learn from 
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and about each other (Inkpen, 1998), along with more expertise, information, knowledge and 
capabilities (Gulati, 1998). From the resource-based viewpoint (Barney, 1991; Wernerfelt, 
1984), past experience represents a way to accumulate internal knowledge and develop 
specific competencies. Prior participation in previous external coalitions enables firms to 
bring to the current coalition their expertise, experience and technologies in more efficient 
ways. Klepper and Simons (2000) show that prior experience and reputation in radio 
production gave firms an advantage over new entrants in the emerging TV industry. Further, 
in the game console industry the successful introduction of Sony’s Playstation 1 in 1995 
despite Nintendo’s leadership position was strongly and significantly due to its reputation and 
credibility as highlighted by Gallagher and Park (2002). This enabled the coalition to 
successfully impose its standard and gain the advantage. Moreover, since coalitions are 
difficult to manage when partners have divergent interests, managing alliances requires 
specific competencies. These can be developed through repeated experience of alliance 
forming and management (Sampson, 2005; Moatti, 2009). Therefore, we expect alliance 
experience to positively affect the success of a coalition’s standard.  
 
HYPOTHESIS 1a. The greater the number of prior alliances and participation in external 
consortia, the greater the success of a coalition’s standard.  
 
Prior ties among competitors (social distance) 
 
Moreover, although prior ties provide companies with more expertise, information, 
knowledge and capabilities, prior experience with coalition membership provides more trust 
and willingness to share knowledge (Tsai and Ghoshal, 1998; Levin and Cross, 2004; Singh, 
2005). Thus, knowledge is more likely to be easily exchanged and transmitted, which may 
improve the coalition’s ability to influence standard setting. Prior ties among a coalition’s 
members increases the efficiency of technical teams, at negotiations level and consequently in 
standard development (Leiponen, 2008). Prior collaboration with members of the coalition 
and especially with direct competitors could convey the degree of social distance (Singh, 
2005; Xia et al., 2008). Therefore, from this social network perspective, we argue that prior 
experience influences subsequent standardization decisions.   
 
HYPOTHESIS 1b: The greater the number of prior alliances among competitors, the greater 
the success of a coalition’s standard. 
 
2.2 Size and network effect 
 
One striking phenomenon associated with standardization is network effects. Network effects 
arise when there is inter-dependence among different components or members of an economic 
system (Hirschman, 1958). An example of a market characterized by virtual network effects is 
the consumer electronics market (Gandal and Shy, 2001): the utility of consumers is 
increasing through the variety of complementary products available for a base product. 
Network effects may also be driven by large platform leaders (Simcoe, 2008) who coordinate 
different types of members. This leads to a dominant platform, although major or dominant 
firms are not required for a dominant platform (Bresnahan and Greenstein, 1999).  
 
Generally speaking, it is now widely recognized that increasing returns (Arthur, 1994, 1998), 
network effects (Katz and Shapiro 1986) and installed base, i.e. the number of units actually 
in use, (Farrell and Saloner, 1985) are key drivers of standard wars. Both theoretical and 
empirical evidence suggest that in many markets with standard competition, network effects 
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help the strong become stronger and can “tip” the market toward a single, winner-take-all 
standard (Liu et al., 2008). As Shapiro and Varian (1999) say: “Standards wars are especially 
bitter in markets with strong network effects, where consumers place great value on 
compatibility and interconnection with each other. These markets tend to exhibit positive 
feedback and "tip" to a single winner”.  
 
Numerous empirical works have emphasized the role played by these variables in different 
markets such as video cassette recorders (Cusumano et al., 1992), automated teller machines 
(Saloner and Shepard, 1995); U.S. telecommunications (Majumdar and Venkataraman, 1998), 
compact disks (Gandal et al., 2000), DVD (Dranove and Gandal, 2003), 56K modems 
(Augereau and Greenstein, 2001) or flash memory cards (Liu et al., 2008). One of the 
arguments put forward by these studies is that the standard’s value increases when network 
size reaches critical mass. In other words, the size of the installed base provides an “extra 
push” to the chances of a standard’s success. 
 
In addition, alliance or coalition size is a determinant factor in a firm’s decision to join a 
coalition (Weiss and Sirbu, 1990). Firms decide to join the largest coalition to increase the 
likelihood of success (Axelrod et al, 1995; Weiss and Cargill, 1992). Several studies have 
shown that network effects (Dranove and Gandal, 2003) and the number of firms in a 
coalition (Valdes-Llaneza and Garcia-Canal, 2006; Leiponen, 2008; Aggarwal, Dai and 
Walden, 2009; Waguespack and Fleming, 2009) play a significant role in reducing market 
risk and consequently affect the standard’s success. 
 
HYPOTHESIS 2a. There is a positive relationship between the size of the firms involved in the 
coalition and the success of a standard. 
 
In a similar vein, the size of the firms in the coalition determines their contribution in power 
and reputation, and consequently can affect the rate of R&D collaboration (Hypothesis 2b). 
There are some indications in the literature that larger companies have a higher propensity to 
engage in partnerships than smaller companies (Duysters and Hagedoorn 1995; Mytelka 
1991), which could explain their participation in coalitions (Duysters and Lemmens 2008). 
Therefore, we expect the size of coalition members to determine whether they are key-
players. In such cases the absolute as well as the relative size of the coalition is important 
(Backhaus et al., 2009) and the size of the coalition is more important in earlier years than in 
later years with respect to levels of technology adoption (Majumdar and Venkataraman, 
1998). 
 
HYPOTHESIS 2b. There is a positive relationship between the size of R&D expenditure 
across the firms in the coalition and the success of a standard. 
 
Knowledge of intellectual property rights (IPRs) - including patents, copyrights, and 
trademarks that may directly impact the standard-setting process (Shapiro, 2001b) - is 
imperative for establishing any industry technology standard that effectively facilitates 
widespread commercialization of innovations. Further, patents are increasingly involved in 
various competition policies related to standard-setting organizations (Schmalensee, 2009). 
Standards in the information and communications technology sectors often involve complex 
technologies and consequently require the use of multiple patented technologies. Digital 
technology, for example, lowers the cost of reproduction and enables new forms of 
transmission. This poses threats to copyright industries and market structures that have 
evolved on the basis of older technologies and definitions of property rights linked to these 
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older technologies. “Companies therefore optimally patent all innovations, and patents 
become an exact measure of innovative activity” (Horstmann et al., 1985, p. 838). Therefore, 
we argue that the coalition which has the largest patent portfolios is the most likely to achieve 
higher technological innovation standards, which may contribute to its success.  
 
HYPOTHESIS 2c. There is a positive relationship between the coalition’s stock of technology 
(technology dominance) and the success of a standard. 
 
2.3 Coopetitive effects (Direct competitors & Relatedness) 
 
Establishing strategic alliances with rivals is perfectly in line with the logic of “coopetitive” 
strategies in business ecosystems (Dagnino and Padula, 2002; Le Roy and Yami, 2009). 
Coopetition occurs when rivals both cooperate and compete according to simultaneous and/or 
sequential multi-dimensional sequences.  Standardization is a relevant example of how the 
coopetition has evolved (M’Chirgui, 2005).  One striking feature of recent decades is the 
proliferation of rivals grouping in a single coalition, also known as platform leaders (Gawer 
and Cusumano, 2008). Rival firms in various sectors group together within business 
ecosystems (Moore, 1996) to impose a standard against the standards backed by rival business 
ecosystems. They cooperate within the business ecosystem and compete for the position of 
leader(s) within the same business ecosystem and on the markets with products incorporating 
the standard. 
 
When battling to be the winner in a standard war, companies should try to gain control over 
an installed base, broadly license their intellectual property and facilitate partner investment in 
complementary innovation (Shapiro and Varian, 1998). They should also invest in building 
brand equity as well as manufacturing, distribution and service capabilities (Gawer and 
Cusumano, 2008). Thus, the dimensions of coopetitive games affect both vertical and 
horizontal relationships relying on suppliers, complementors, competitors, distributors, etc. 
This seems particularly important in the context of technological convergence, which is 
pervasive in sector like computers, telecommunications equipment and digital appliances.  
 
Well-known examples of this logic are the famous JVC’s VHS versus Sony’s Betamax for 
videocassette recording and Microsoft’s Windows versus Apple’s Macintosh for personal 
computer operating systems. The standard war between Sony’s Blu-ray and Toshiba’s HD-
DVD for high-definition media storage also exemplifies such behavior. Therefore the 
presence of a sufficient number of major rivals from different sectors broadens the installed 
base and consequently increases the standard’s chances of success.  
 
However, because we are dealing with two standards only in this paper, the number of 
competitors cannot be directly used in the model to test for a coopetitive effect: such a 
number would be a perfect predictor of success. We circumvent this by considering 
knowledge-relatedness or technical distance as an indicator of the presence of rivals within a 
coalition. Technical distance is the degree of dissimilarity in technology knowledge bases 
between two firms. A large technical distance is known to be more likely to impede the 
achieving of synergies in alliances (Bleeke and Ernst, 1995; Yang and Lin, 2005) and to have 
a negative effect on absorptive capacity (Cohen and Levinthal, 1990). A standard coalition is 
basically technology-driven and run by multiple alliance business market groups. If there is a 
big gap in knowledge-relatedness among groups of companies within the coalition, conflict 
can arise and interests increasingly diverge. Differences in performance among competing 
coalitions can be attributed to the nature of the technological knowledge they possess and 
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their ability to exploit that knowledge (Steensma and Corley, 2000). Unrelated technologies 
often require a radical change in the way research is organized (Kogut and Zander, 1992) and 
consequently become counterproductive (Dosi, 1988). Thus, too great a cognitive distance 
makes basic mutual understanding unachievable (Gilsing and Duysters, 2008). 
 
However, the opposite may in some cases be true. A coalition composed of different business 
market actors, each forming alliance groups, will more easily overcome any lack of 
competencies or technologies, especially when the founders have made a preliminary 
selection. Yet, as a standard coalition aims to bring together different innovation partners, 
external knowledge is crucial because any innovation arises from the recombination of 
component elements (Kogut and Zander, 1992). Difference in knowledge is therefore 
important for learning and innovation (Nelson and Winter, 1982). In addition, the presence of 
several major complement producers from different industries increases the likelihood of 
reaching critical mass quickly through network effects and group technological specialization 
(Duysters and Lemmens, 2008). Therefore groups with higher technological specialization are 
likely to be more innovative, making them particularly attractive team members. The groups’ 
knowledge-relatedness therefore seems to have an effect on the success of a standard 
coalition. In this paper we argue that high knowledge-relatedness negatively affects the 
likelihood of a coalition’s success. 
 
HYPOTHESIS 3. High knowledge-relatedness decreases the likelihood of success of a 
standard-setting coalition  
 
Some degree of differentiation in technological capabilities among the companies may enrich 
the coalition knowledge base and create opportunities for learning (Hitt et al., 1996) provided 
that it is moderate. Several studies have stressed the importance of cooperation among 
companies with a minimum degree of similarity in their knowledge-base in order to maintain 
sufficient absorptive capacity (Stuart, 1998; Tanriverdi and Venkatraman, 2005; Goerzen and 
Beamish, 2005). Others have even split this degree of difference into multiple dimensions, 
arguing the curvilinear effect of cognitive distance on innovation (inverted U-shaped) 
(Nooteboom, 1999; Nooteboom et al., 2007). Thus, an inter-industry difference between the 
innovating company and its partners can be interpreted as one of the specific dimensions of 
cognitive distance (Li and Vanhaverbeke, 2009).  
 
3. Methodology  
 
3.1 Sample and data 
 
The sample consists of the agreements undertaken by founders Sony (for Blu-ray) and 
Toshiba (for HD-DVD) to form their standard coalition. Data were directly collected from 
internet sites and several databases. Two types of site were consulted, namely corporate 
coalition member sites and sites specializing in the fields of ITC, video and mass-produced 
electronic goods. The search criteria used were alliances, coalitions and other forms of 
cooperation among business ecosystem members.  
Such a method based on secondary data raises certain issues. First, the reliability of secondary 
data, particularly when it comes from websites, may be difficult to establish (Dochartaigh, 
2002). To ensure data was as reliable as possible, we crosschecked various information 
sources (in particular comparing information found on corporate websites with that found on 
specialized sites) and systematically rejected insufficiently reliable information. Further, 
information was crosschecked from Securities Data Corporation (SDC), which offers data on 
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alliance activity starting from 1984 (Schilling, 2009). Secondly, standard sponsors’ and co-
sponsors’ corporate websites are used to disseminate information as well as for 
communications between these players. To limit the risk of propaganda inherent in these 
players’ official communications, great care was devoted to checking the reliability of these 
sources by comparing them with non-corporate websites. 
Coalitions give rise to bipartite networks (Borgatti and Everett, 1997, Newman et al., 2002) 
that have two types of nodes, in our case individual member companies and standard coalition 
founders. Companies can only connect to founders, not directly to other companies of the 
same coalition, which reduces the number of links formed within a coalition. However, 
indirect links are not excluded. The bipartite network thus gives rise to a unipartite projection 
where companies are connected with each other if they are co-members (Newman et al., 
2002). In the bipartite network, a firm’s degree is the number of memberships, while a 
coalition’s degree is the number of members. In the projected unipartite network, a firm’s 
degree is the sum of members (excluding the focal firm) in the coalition in which it 
participates. The existing literature is still unclear on the differences between bipartite 
structure and unipartite projection and usually only the latter is examined. However, because 
it is relevant to consider bipartite structure for networks with affiliation characteristics 
(Leiponen, 2008), we chose it to study standard-setting success. 
 
The total sample consisted of 261 member companies, 191 belonging to the Blu-ray coalition, 
136 belonging to the HD-DVD coalition, and 66 belonging to both coalitions. The data came 
from SDC’s Alliance Database for network construction variables, Compustat for information 
on companies, and Delphion for patents. The data cover the 2000-2008 period, which is 
appropriate, as the standard war started around 2004 and ended in February 2008.  
 
3.2 Variables 
 
Table 1 provides an overview of the way each variable is constructed along with the expected 
signs based on the hypotheses above and the data source, and each variable is detailed below 
(see also Appendix 1 for descriptive statistics). 
  
Dependent variables. The first dependent variable deals with the decision to choose to belong 
either to one coalition or to both coalitions. It is referred to as COALITION. This variable is 
coded 1 if the company chooses to join both coalitions and 0 if the company chooses to 
belong to either the HD-DVD or the Blu-Ray coalitions. 
The second dependent variable measures the companies’ ability to affect the standard’s 
success. It is referred to as SUCCESS. A focus on the bipartite network is appropriate 
because Blu-ray vs. HD-DVD coalitions are characterized by group structures or alliance 
blocks. The dependent variable is a binary choice variable that takes the value 1 if the 
company belongs to the winning coalition (i.e. Blu-ray) and 0 otherwise. 
 
Explanatory variables. Some hypothesized effects need to be measured by social network 
analysis. The first variable, called EXPERIENCE, is the number of prior alliances concluded 
by each member of the coalition. As explained in the lead-up to Hypothesis 1, these prior ties 
indicate the level of expertise, information, knowledge and capabilities developed and held by 
companies over the past. It indicates the experience of membership of each coalition. 
Hypothesis 1a suggests that a large number of prior alliances by the companies in the 
coalition increases the probability of success compared to coalitions with a smaller number of 
prior alliances. Therefore, we expect a positive sign for this variable. 
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The second variable, called SOCIALDistance, measures the number of prior alliances with 
competitors belonging to the same coalition. These prior ties are indicators of how well the 
coalition members know each other and the extent to which information asymmetry and 
indigestibility problems (Hennart and Reddy, 1997) can be assumed to be mitigated. Thus, it 
indicates the degree of social distance (Singh, 2005), which is essential for the efficiency of 
technical teams and consequently the standard outcome (Leiponen, 2008). We expect a 
positive coefficient according to Hypothesis 1b. The prior alliance data for both variables are 
obtained from the SDC’s Alliances database. 
 
Table 1: Description of variables and expected sign 
Variables  Measure     
Dependent variables    
COALITION The company belongs to both coalitions (=1), 0 otherwise 
SUCCESS The company belongs to the winning coalition (=1), 0 otherwise  
Explanatory and control variables Hypothesis Sign   Source  
Network construction     
EXPERIENCE Number of prior alliances concluded 
by each member of the coalition. 
H1a  + SDC 
SOCIALDistance Number of prior alliances with 
competitors belonging to the same 
alliance. 
H1b  
 
+ SDC 
Size and Network effect    
EMPLOYEES Number of employees of a partner 
(every year from 2000 to 2008). 
H2a + Compustat 
REVENUE Revenue of a partner (every year 
from 2000 to 2008). 
H2a  + Compustat 
R&D expenditure Total R&D expenditure of a partner 
(every year from 2000 to 2008). 
H2b + Compustat 
PATENT Number of patents held by members 
of coalition during the period 2000-
2008, indicating technology 
dominance. 
H2c  
 
+ Delphion, 
USPTO, 
EPO 
Coopetitive effect     
RELATEDNESS Average measure of the distance in 
the SIC codes of coalition partners.  
H3 
 
- Compustat 
 
 
The variables REVENUE, number of EMPLOYEES and R&D expenditure are used as 
proxies for firm size. Information is available for publicly traded companies and our sample is 
mainly composed of these companies. These data were collected from Compustat on yearly 
basis from 2000 to 2008. We also compute the percentage change in the Revenue variable 
from 2000 to 2008 (variable PERCREV) and the percentage change in the R&D expenditures 
variable from 2000 to 2008 (variable PERCR&D), which are proxies of the dynamism of a 
partner.4 According to Hypotheses 2a and 2b, we expect the coefficients of these variables to 
be positive. 
 
                                                            
4  Because a decrease in the number of employees can result from improved efficiency or investment in 
technology, we did not compute the percentage change in the number of employees. Monck et al. (1988) and 
Löfsten and Lindelöf (2002) found, for instance, that performance in terms of employment size depends upon the 
age of the firm and show that there is no significant difference between their performances in terms of 
employment. 
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Coalition technological capabilities involve intellectual property. Therefore we use patents 
(PATENT) to indicate the innovative capabilities and technological dominance of each 
coalition. We used two databases: the Delphion and the USPTO (United States Patent and 
Trademark Office). The Delphion database collects yearly patent counts for each of the firms, 
aggregating subsidiary patents up to the ultimate parent level (variable PATENT_Delphion). 
Patents granted were counted in their year of application. Yearly patent counts were created 
for each company for the period from 2000 to 2008. As Delphion gathers patents from 
different worldwide patent offices and to avoid patent duplication, we crosschecked patents 
from USPTO, Japanese patent offices and European patent offices (variable 
PATENT_USPTO). According to Hypothesis 2c, the coefficients of these variables are 
expected to be positive. 
 
Finally, the variable RELATEDNESS measures the distance in the SIC codes of coalition 
members. It is a proxy for coopetitive relationship as well as information asymmetry, 
assessing dissimilarities in the parties’ SIC codes (Villalonga and McGahan, 2005). The 
computation of the distance/proximity between two SIC codes may differ across authors and 
we choose the method used by Li and Vanhaverbeke (2009). A difference between two 
members of a coalition in the SIC’s first digit indicates that these two companies have the 
largest possible difference, whereas two members of a coalition with the same first four digits 
SIC-code are assumed to have a common knowledgebase. The largest difference is measured 
by 4, and identical industries are measured by 0. To be more precise, the dyadic relatedness is 
0 if the primary SIC codes of the partners have the same first four digits, it is 1 if they have 
the same first three digits, it is 2 if they have the same first two digits, it is 3 if they have the 
same first digit and it is 4 if the first digit differs. We then compute the average Relatedness of 
each member with respect to all other members belonging to the same coalition. According to 
Hypothesis 3 we expect the coefficient of the variable to be negative. 
 
Control variables. Because there are some variables not considered in the hypotheses that 
may influence coalition success, we controlled for the two following variables (see Table 2 
for their distribution in the sample). 
The nationality of the partner: We use dummy variables to distinguish between Asian partners 
(ASIA), North-American partners (NORTH-AMERICA) and European partners 
(EUROPE). 
The status of the partner. We distinguish 5 groups of partners supporting a coalition: format 
founders and competitors (FORMATFOUNDER)5, movie studio supports (MOVIE), major 
movie rental outlets (MAJOR), nationwide retail and major online supports (ONLINE), and 
companies listed as Members, Associate Members, or Contributors (MISCELLANEOUS). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                            
5 Including companies listed as Members of the Board or Managing Members. 
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Table 2 Distribution of the status and the nationality of the partners by coalition (n=261) 
 HD-DVD Blu-ray Both coalitions Total 
Status of the partner     
      Format founder and competitors 2 13 9 24 
      Movie Studio supports 3 12 0 15 
      Major movie rental outlets  0 2 1 3 
      Nationwide retail and major   
         Online supports 0 2 5 7 
      Miscellaneous (Members, assoc. 
          members and contributors) 65 96 51 212 
Total 70 125 66 261 
Nationality of the partner     
      Asia 25 44 38 107 
      Europe 6 20 5 31 
      North-America 13 40 13 66 
      Missing 26 21 10 57 
Total 70 125 66 261 
 
It can be seen that no Major movie rental outlets or nationwide retail and major Online 
supports belong to the HD-DVD coalition, whereas no Movie studio support belong to both 
coalitions. The nationality was known for 79.2% of the partners. The majority were from 
Asian countries (52.4% including Australia and New-Zealand), almost one third were from 
North-American countries (32.4%) and the remainder from European countries (15.2%, 
including Israel). 
Although the number of partners cannot be used in the models, it is obvious that the Blu-ray 
coalition contains the largest overall number of partners as well as the largest internal groups 
of partners, especially with respect to Format Founders (horizontal coopetition) and Movie 
Studio, Major movie rental and Online supports (vertical coopetition). 
 
3.3 Estimation method  
 
The two dependent variables are qualitative, and two independent binary response models 
have been estimated by Maximum Likelihood.6 Because these models are non-linear, the 
interpretation of a given coefficient deserves attention since its impact on the dependent 
variable is not obvious. We hence provide the reader with marginal effects in the last column 
of the tables of results. For a given explanatory variable in the model, this marginal effect thus 
represents how the predicted probability of the modality explained (belonging either to both 
coalitions or to the winning coalition) changes at the mean values of the other explanatory 
variables. 
 
4. Results  
4.1 Factors affecting the decision to belong to one or to both coalitions 
 
We explore the factors affecting the decision to belong to one or to both coalitions. The 
dependent variable is COALITION (COALITION=1 if the company belongs to both 
coalitions, COALITION=0 if the company belongs to either the Blu-Ray coalition or the HD-
DVD coalition). The results of the best model are given in Table 3 with some measures of fit.  
                                                            
6 The current database does not allow a panel probit estimation over the 2000-2008 period as the date at which 
every company joined the coalitions have not yet been fully retrieved. A better account of the time dimension is 
one of our future research perspective. 
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Table 3 Estimation of the probability of belonging to one or to both coalitions (n=197) 
Parameter Estimate Std Err Student t Pr > |t| Marginal effect 
Intercept -69.0681 27.0219 -2.56 0.011 - 
ASIA .8958 .3842 2.33 0.020 .1604** 
ONLINE 1.4901 .3233 4.61 0.000 -.2717*** 
FORMATFOUNDER .57909 .2265 2.56 0.011 .1056** 
RELATEDNESS 38.409 15.5307 2.47 0.013 7.0038*** 
(RELATEDNESS)2 -5.4344 2.2308 -2.44 0.015 -.9910*** 
Log-likelihood: -99.52       LR test of nullity(5): 34.28             p-value < 0.0001 
Mc Fadden LRI: 0.1469     Maddala Pseudo R²: 0.3214        % of correct predictions: 82.2 
***: p-value < .01, ** : p-value <.05 
 
The overall quality of the model is satisfactory, the two measures of fit are correct and the 
model correctly predicts the decision in 162 out of 197 cases (82.2%) with a cut-off at .42. 
Three control variables as well as a quadratic function of RELATEDNESS are significant.  
Among the control variables, being an Asian firm (ASIA), being a “NationWide retail and 
major online support” (ONLINE), or being a format founder and competitors 
(FORMATFOUND) positively influence the probability of belonging to both coalitions. 
Hence, ceteris paribus, belonging to an Asian country (ASIE) significantly increases the 
probability of belonging to both coalitions by 16%, being an ONLINE support increases the 
probability of belonging to both coalitions by 27% and belonging to the 
FORMATFOUNDER group increases this probability by 10.6%. 
Analyzing of the effect of Relatedness is problematic due to its non-linearity and due to the 
intrinsic non-linearity of any binary response model. We represent its effect in Figure 1, 
where the probability of success is computed over the entire range of the relatedness variable 
(i.e. from 2.84 to 3.98), and at the mean values for the other explanatory variables 
(ASIE=0.532995, ONLINE=0.071066 and FORMATFOUND=0.172589).  
We observe that the marginal effect of relatedness follows an inverted-U relationship (an 
increase in the average relatedness increases the probability of belonging to both coalitions up 
to 3.53, and then decreases it). More formally, a 10% decrease in the average relatedness, 
from 3.53 to 3.18, lowers the probability of belonging to both coalitions by 14.8% and a 10% 
increase, from 3.53 to 3.8, lowers this probability by the same amount.  
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Figure 1 Effect of Relatedness on predicted probabilities at 
the sample mean
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4.2 Factors determining the success of the standard 
 
The factors determining the success of a standard are explored. The decision is also modelled 
by Maximum Likelihood (ML) using a binary Logit model. The dependent variable is 
SUCCESS (SUCCESS =1 if the company belongs to the winning coalition, and 0 otherwise). 
The results of the best model are given in Table 4 with some measures of fit. 
Table 4 Estimation of the probability of belonging to the successful coalition (n=132) 
Parameter Estimate Std Err Student t Pr > |t| Marginal effect 
Intercept 1623.231 446.26 3.64 0.000 - 
Ln(Revenue2007) .197067 .09191 2.14 0.032 .0196* 
RELATEDNESS -1433.314 392.95 -3.65 0.000 -143.172*** 
(RELATEDNESS)2 419.5879 114.69 3.66 0.000 41.912*** 
(RELATEDNESS)3 -40.7158 11.09 -3.67 0.000 -4.067*** 
Log-likelihood: -50.60       LR test of nullity(4): 23.96             p-value < 0.0001 
Mc Fadden LRI: 0.1915     Maddala Pseudo R²: 0.2984        % of correct predictions: 84.1 
***: p-value < .01, ** : p-value <.05, *: p-value<.1 
 
The overall quality of the model is satisfactory, the two measures of fit are correct and the 
model correctly predicts the adoption in 111 out of 132 cases (84.1%). Two variables appear 
as significant: a logarithmic function of revenue and a cubic function of RELATEDNESS.  
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Among the variables standing for the size and network effects, only the revenue variable 
appears as significant. The best model is obtained with the logarithm of the 2007 revenue, 
which is significant with a positive coefficient. This supports Hypothesis 2a: an increase in 
the Log (revenue2007) by one unit increases the probability of belonging to the successful 
coalition by 1.97%.7  
Finally, the effect of Relatedness is shown in Figure 2, where the probability of success is 
computed over the entire range of the relatedness variable (i.e. from 2.84 to 3.98), and at the 
mean values for the other explanatory variable (LnRevenue2007=6.742).  
We observe that the marginal effect of relatedness is roughly decreasing (an increase in the 
average relatedness decreases the probability of success) but in a non-linear way. Indeed, 
there is a portion of the range (between 3.2 and 3.7) where the effect is increasing. This 
finding can be contrasted with Sapienza et al. (2004), who found an inverted U-shaped 
relationship between sales growth and technological and production knowledge-relatedness 
(but no significant relationship with marketing knowledge-relatedness). Overall, the closer the 
code SIC (and hence the greater the similarity of the members of the coalition), the higher the 
probability of success, which supports Hypothesis 3.  
 
Figure 2 Effect of Relatedness on predicted probabilities at 
the sample mean
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7 Note that we also estimated models with the log of the revenue for all years between 2000 to 2008. We 
obtained similar results: a marginal effect of log (revenue) on the probability of success, ranging from 1.3% in 
2000 to 2.2% in 2006. This effect is significant at 5% for all years except 2000 and 2001. An interesting 
possibility is a potential endogeneity between the revenue of a company in a given year and the future success of 
the standard. Indeed, the success may partly be due to better sales of the products adopting the standard, hence 
increased revenues of the companies. This issue seems difficult to explore further without using a dynamic 
approach that the current dataset does not allow. 
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5. Implications and conclusion 
An extensive literature on standardization exists, but says little about how firms choose to join 
standard-setting coalitions nor about the determinants of coalition success. Our work attempts 
to fill this void by examining the circumstances under which firms prefer to join two 
coalitions instead of one, and the factors that explain the success of standard-setting 
coalitions. We focus on the Blu-ray vs. HD-DVD standard war in the electronic video market. 
By considering the standard-setting coalition as a bipartite network, this study provides 
empirical support for the effect of prior alliances, network effect and coopetitive behavior. We 
find evidence that coalition size and coopetitive behavior are important in determining 
patterns of standard-setting success. 
 
Our findings with regard to relatedness do indeed correspond to expectations rooted in the 
coopetitive rationale. The higher the similarity of the members in the coalition, the greater the 
probability of standard coalition success. Furthermore, relatedness leads to a greater 
probability of joining both competing coalitions. However, the relatedness effect is not linear 
and at a given degree of knowledge difference, an opposite effect exists. This confirms the 
non-linearity of the relatedness effect found in Nooteboon et al. (2007)’s (U-shaped argument 
of cognitive distance) or Sapienza et al. (2004) (inverted U-shaped relationship of production 
knowledge- and technological knowledge-relatedness with sales growth). Moreover, being an 
Asian firm increases the probability of belonging to both coalitions. As the principal founders 
are Asian firms, geographical proximity seems to play a role in determining the propensity of 
firms to engage in innovative alliances (Narula and Santangelo, 2009). Cultural differences 
(Kogut and Singh, 1988) as well as psychic distance (Johanson and Vahlne, 1977; Nordstrom 
and Vahlne, 1994) may also be expected to play a role in coalition forming. From a 
transaction-cost theory perspective, it could be reasoned that the higher level of uncertainty 
associated with international contacts is expected to lead to an increased need for control. 
Because the costs of monitoring and maintaining control over a long distance are high, there 
is greater probability that most members of coalitions belong to the same region of the world.  
 
Thus, the level of uncertainty will be lower when companies contract agreements with other 
partners located in the same economic block because they are familiar with the same 
economic, legal and political environment. In addition, direct relationships induce more trust, 
improving willingness of individuals to share knowledge (Tsai and Ghoshal 1998, Levin and 
Cross 2004). Furthermore, it is widely acknowledged that geographical proximity positively 
influences network externalities (Jaffe et al., 1993; Fujita and Thisse, 2002).  
 
Our findings with regard to size and network effect reveal several interesting points. First, 
high revenues increase the probability of joining the winning coalition. Second, it appears at 
first glance that size of coalition has a significant effect on the probability of standard 
coalition success. Founders (especially electronic goods manufacturers and ITC firms) and 
major studio supports are likely to have been main drivers of standard coalition success in the 
case of the Blu-ray versus HD-DVD standard war. Interestingly, these results converge with 
the finding dealing with the relatedness argument. The presence of a sufficient number of 
similar actors respectively at horizontal and vertical axis is decisive for the standard’s success. 
This indicates that the coopetitive behavior needs to occur not only at horizontal level but also 
at downstream and upstream levels; here the role of particular vertical players, in this case the 
Hollywood studios, was crucial to the Blu-ray standard’s success. This was not the case for 
HD-DVD, with fewer coopetitive agreements, mainly at the downstream level. Third, it 
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emerges that founders and some major co-sponsors will act as attractors for other companies 
and consequently prefer to belong to one coalition rather than both whereas some downstream 
and/or upstream leading, as well as smaller companies prefer to act as followers and bet on 
both coalitions. Some of the latter will subsequently abandon one coalition and only remain in 
the coalition whose standard tends to draw positive feedback, “tipping” to a single winner. 
 
In fact, one key reason why Toshiba stopped developing, manufacturing, and marketing HD-
DVD players in February 2008 is that several leading co-sponsors decided to stop supporting 
the HD-DVD format. Hollywood majors gradually abandoned the HD-DVD coalition to join 
the Blu-ray coalition, which led Toshiba to announce its withdrawal from HD-DVD. Among 
the Hollywood majors, only Warner Bros and Paramount Pictures abandoned HD-DVD in 
2008. Similarly, Microsoft’s decision to back HD-DVD and Apple’s commitment in favor of 
Blu-ray were weighty decisions for both alliances, as both are major players in their 
respective fields. The presence of major players in the coalition, especially suppliers of 
complements and co-sponsoring firms, is likely to increase coalition success by strengthening 
its ability to impose its standard (Backhaus et al., 2009). However, results on size effect will 
require further confirmation and more in depth analyses need to be undertaken before we can 
be fully conclusive. Note that our findings indicate that firms joining a standard-setting 
initiative have incentives to be part of the same coalition because their collective actions will 
ultimately affect the standard’s chances of success. 
 
Moreover, we find that neither past collaboration nor experience significantly affects the 
probability of standard success or belonging to both coalitions. Furthermore, variables dealing 
with innovation (patents and R&D expenditure) do not seem to significantly affect standard 
coalition success. One key explanation is the symmetry of the coalitions in terms of 
innovation: both include major information communication technology firms and electronic 
goods manufacturers with a strong innovation base.  
 
 
In addition, empirical evidence supports the findings by Duysters and Lemmens (2008), that 
not every firm can join a standard setting coalition. Rather, the standard-setting coalition is 
carefully composed, with large founding firms selecting technologically similar firms 
(relatedness) to add to the unique innovative capabilities of the group. Because of these 
selection mechanisms, competing for specific partners and their distinct technologies will 
even enforce the group-based competition in the coalition (Duysters and Lemmens, 2008). 
 
These findings have implications for management. First, they support the hypothesis that both 
size and network effect are crucial to standard coalition success. Thus, firms should join the 
largest coalition. Second, our findings indicate that a broad coopetitive standardization 
approach is more beneficial than concentrating on only a few selected cooperative 
arrangements. Further, the coopetitive approach should involve both downstream and 
upstream actors. Yet one noteworthy finding from the results is that a contained form of 
coopetition is to be recommended. In support of Hypothesis 3, we find that the greater the 
similarity of the members in the coalition, the higher the probability of success; but the 
marginal effect of relatedness evolves in a non-linear way, indicating that a critical number of 
similar actors at multidimensional levels is required. Finally, to gain competitive advantage it 
is advisable to influence and attract these actors (suppliers of complements and co-sponsors), 
offering them sufficient incentives to join one coalition and discouraging them from 
supporting rival coalitions (Besen and Farrel, 1994; Soh, 2010). 
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Although the geographical proximity effect has not been covered in this paper per se, it 
appears from the results (the nationality of the partner) as well as from the social distance 
argument that companies could learn and earn a lot through cooperation with direct 
competitors to build a market and set up a successful standard. Thus, firms could widen their 
knowledge portfolio and further strengthen their knowledge base. However, there is a 
drawback: as firms cooperate with direct competitors, the risk of losing their competitive 
position through outflow of their own knowledge to competitors (Singh, 2004) increases. We 
indeed confirm the multiple dimension of the degree of knowledge difference previously 
found (see Nooteboon et al., 2007; or Sapienza et al., 2004) but we obtain a more complex 
pattern than the mere U-shaped (or inverted U-shape) relationship between knowledge-
relatedness and a coalition’s standard success. This issue is worth exploring in further detail.  
 
Finally, this paper has some limitations. First, some missing data limit the number of partners 
used in the econometric estimations. Second, we take coalition as a bipartite network. This is 
a handicap that prevents a deep analysis of social distances between coalitions’ memberships 
at dyad level and the capture of more structural network effects. This may explain the result 
obtained regarding Hypothesis 1 (no significant link between the number of past alliances and 
the probability of success). This also prevents us from exploring how the geographical 
proximity effect impacts the decision to choose one coalition, as well as its probability of 
success.  
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APPENDIX 1 – Descriptive statistics (n=261) 
Variables Mean Stand.- Dev. Min. Max. Missing
SUCCESS (=1) 0.73181 0.44387 0 1 0 
COALITION=1 0.25287 0.43549 0 1 0 
ASIA (=1) 0.52451 0.50063 0 1 57 
NORTH-AMERICA (=1) 0.32353 0.46897 0 1 57 
EUROPE (=1) 0.15196 0.35987 0 1 57 
FORMATFOUNDER (=1) 0.09195 0.28896 0 1 0 
MOVIE (=1) 0.05747 0.23274 0 1 0 
ONLINE (=1) 0.02682 0.16156 0 1 0 
MAJOR (=1) 0.01149 0.10659 0 1 0 
MISCELLANEOUS (=1) 0.81226 0.39050 0 1 0 
PATENTS_Delphion (overall number on 
2000-2008) 
9563.713 23136.37 0 122330 118 
PATENTS_USPTO (overall number on 
2000-2008) 
712.601 2784.297 0 18013 118 
RELATEDNESS (average) 3.43706 0.32494 2.844 3.975 57 
SOCIALDistance (number) 9.84762 23.6963 0 112 156 
PASTCollaboration (number) 38.0149 86.1237 0 542 127 
ALL-TIES (number)     
EMPLOYEES in 2000 (in thousands) 53.31156 140.0953 0.055 1400 156 
EMPLOYEES in 2007 (in thousands) 62.28357 214.2614 0.047 2100 156 
REVENUE in 2000 (USD millions) 7317.768 20296.18 0 192003 141 
REVENUE in 2007 (USD millions) 17093.12 62444.13 .833 546274.1 134 
R&D expenditure in 2000 (USD millions) 297.567 714.639 0 4006 163 
R&D expenditure in 2008 (USD millions) 502.508 1189.63 0 8164 150 
PERCREV (in percentage) 445.749 2046.65 -85.98 16511.76 151 
PERCR&D (in percentage) 357.789 2179.74 -100 21950 118 
 
 
